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Chapter I.  Legislative Framework
1. Overview of the Legal System of Korea
The legal system of Korea is based on the civil law model of
Germany and Japan.  The relevant laws at the national level, in order
of importance, are comprised of the relevant statutory code,
enforcement acts (Presidential Orders), enforcement regulations
(Ministerial Orders), and notifications.  There are a few municipal
regulations at the local level.  Although case law precedent is not
considered binding on the court, prior  court rulings (particularly
those of the Supreme Court) significantly influence judaical decision
making.
A law suit (whether civil or criminal) in Korea begins in the
District Court; the first level of the three-level Korean court
system.  The District Court usually renders its verdict approximately
six to ten months after commencement of the action.  An appeal may
be taken by either party to the High Court within two weeks of the
date on which the District Court judgment is served on the party.
The High Court usually reaches a decision in approximately six
to ten months.  A party may appeal to the Supreme Court within two
weeks of receipt of the decision of the High Court.  Grounds for
appeal to the Supreme Court are limited to assertions that the
decision of the High Court was in violation of the Korean
Constitution, or of a valid law, order or regulation of Korea.  The
Supreme Court either renders a final judgment or returns the case to
the High Court for reconsideration.  If the case is decided by the
Supreme Court, its decision is final and binding.  However, if the
case is returned to the high court, it may take another six to ten
months for the High Court to reconsider its original decision.
If either party is dissatisfied with the High Court's
reconsideration of its decision, that party may re-appeal to the
Supreme Court. 
If a favorable judgment is rendered by the District Court in a
civil suit, the Court may in its discretion allow the successful
claimant to execute the judgment and satisfy his claim out of the
assets (if any) of the judgment debtor.  If no appeal is launched by
2the defendant, the claimant may execute the judgment as a matter of
course.
There is no pre-trial "discovery" in Korea.  Although compulsory
production of documents during trial is possible, requests for
production of documents must be specific, not general.  Testimony
and/or production of documents by non-parties can also be compelled
during trial, but only upon a showing of good cause.  Therefore, the
plaintiff should endeavour to obtain and produce all the evidence
required to establish its case.  Class actions are not permissible
under Korean legal system.
2. Competition Laws and Regulations
The Korean Constitutional Law effective as of October 27, 1980,
first adopted the concept of regulation and control of anti-
competitive practices in Article 120, Paragraph 3 thereof.  Based
upon the principle enunciated in the Constitutional Law, the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act ("MRFTA") was enacted on December 23,
1980 and came into force on April 1, 1981.  The MRFTA is the basic
competition law in Korea and has been amended three times; December
1986, January 1990 and December 1992.  Other legislation in the area
of competition law includes the Fair Sub-contract Transaction Act,
the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, and the Price Stabilization
and Fair Trade Act.  Various regulations and notifications have been
promulgated under the above Acts.
     Although the Korean government has attempted for more than a
decade to regulate both anti-competitive structures and activities,
such efforts to enforce the MRFTA and related legislation have not
in practice been substantial or efficient.
Chapter II. Implementation of Competition Law
1. Enforcement Agencies
The Fair Trade Commission ("FTC") is an independent government
agency established under the auspices of the Economic Planning Board.
the FTC is primarily responsible for the enforcement of competition
law.  The FTC consists of seven members, including some part-time
members.  The FTC has its own staff and four regional offices  to co-
ordinate anti-competition policy and to regulate anti-competitive
activities.
2. Administrative Actions
3The FTC is vested with the authority to issue Corrective Actions
and to impose Administrative Surcharges in the nature of fines.
Also, certain types of transactions must be reported to, and accepted
by, the FTC in order to be effective and enforceable.
2.1 Corrective Actions
The FTC may issue a Corrective Order which may include (i) an
order  suspending or cancelling unlawful activities, transactions or
agreements, (ii) an order to publicize the violation in the media,
and (iii) any other actions necessary to correct the violation.  A
Corrective Order can only be issued by resolution of the FTC after
an administrative hearing.  The alleged violator thus has sufficient
opportunity to present its defense before the FTC.  An appeal of a
Corrective Order can be made to the High Court and, in turn, after
the judgement of the High Court, to the Supreme Court.
The FTC may recommend corrective actions without the formal FTC
hearing procedure in the case of minor violations. 
2.2 Administrative Surcharge
The FTC may impose administrative surcharges in the nature of
fines upon a violator of certain type of anti-competitive activities
including abuse of dominant market position, conspiracy and mergers
or acquisitions in violation of the Act.
2.3 Notification Requirements
In the case of certain types of mergers and acquisitions, and
international agreements, the parties must report the contemplated
transaction to and, obtain the approval of, the FTC.  The FTC reviews
whether the contemplated transaction complies with applicable
competition law.
3. Criminal Sanctions
Violations of competition law may be subject to criminal
sanctions if the FTC refers the matter to the police or prosecutors
office for further investigation. In practice, however, the FTC
usually issues a Corrective Order before it refers the violator to
the police or prosecutor.  If the violator complies with the
Corrective Order, the FTC rarely seeks criminal sanctions.  Criminal
sanctions may include both imprisonment and fines.
4. Civil Actions
Unlike the United States, Korean government agencies including
4the FTC never use civil actions to enforce competition law.  Rather,
the FTC relies upon its own administrative tribunal apparatus.
Although private claims for damages arising out of anti-competitive
activities may be brought before the court, treble damage claims is
not permissible.  Further, a civil action under the MRFTA cannot be
initiated until all administrative proceedings and appeals in
connection with a given Corrective Action order have been exhausted
and the order has thus become final and conclusive.  A civil action
can be initiated based upon general tort theory before the Corrective
Action order becomes final.  Practically, however, it is difficult
to establish the tort since the plaintiff must prove the violation
of competition law and that such violation was due to the negligence
of the defendant.  Accordingly, there are few judicial decisions
concerning civil claims for damages due to a violation of competition
law. 
Chapter III. Anti-Competitive Behavior
1.   Undue Collaborative Behavior
     Chapter 4 of the MRFTA deals with undue collaborative activities
as one of the anti-competitive acts.
     The collaborative activities listed below which substantially
restrict competition in any particular field of trade are prohibited
in principle:
(i) Fixing, maintaining, or altering prices;
    (ii) Restricting the terms and conditions for the sale of
commodities or for rendering services, or the terms and
conditions for the payment of prices and compensation
thereof;
   (iii) Restricting production, shipment, transportation, sales of
commodities or rendering of services;
    (iv) Restricting the sales territory of trade or customers;
(v) Restricting or interrupting new establishment or expansion
of facilities, inducement of equipment for production of
commodities or rendering of services;
    (vi) Restricting the kinds or sizes of commodities at the time
of production or sale thereof;
   (vii) Establishing a corporation to implement or manage the main
part of its business in a collaborative fashion;
  (viii) Restricting or interrupting the nature of a business or
activities of another entrepreneur.
     It is difficult to prove collaboration.  Thus, if two or more
parties commit any of the above prohibited activities which
5substantially lessen competition in a particular market,
collaboration is presumed.
2. Monopolization
     Except for the above undue collaborative acts and subject to the
merger controls discussed below, monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize itself is not prohibited by the MRFTA.  However, the
business activities of a company having a monopoly are more tightly
regulated than those of companies in competition.
3. Abuse of a Dominant Market Position
     Specific types of abusive trade practices by market-dominating
entrepreneurs of a certain size are prohibited under Article 3 of the
MRFTA.
     The term "market-dominating entrepreneur" provided for by the
MRFTA includes entrepreneurs whose market share fall under one of the
following categories.  In each case, the total supply of the
commodity or service in the subject market must exceed 30 billion
Won:
(i) One entrepreneur's market share is 50% or more; or
    (ii) The aggregated market share of two or three entrepreneurs
is 75% or more, provided, however, that an entrepreneur
whose market share is less than 10% is excluded.
     The market-dominating entrepreneur is prohibited from engaging
in the following abusive acts:
(i) Unreasonable determination, maintenance, or alteration of
the price of a commodity or service;
    (ii) Unreasonable control of the sales of commodities or the
provision of services;
   (iii) Unreasonable interference with the business activities of
other entrepreneurs;
    (iv) Unreasonable hinderance of the entry of new competitive
entrepreneurs; or
     (v) An activity substantially restricting competition or
damaging significantly the interest of consumers.
4. Resale Price Maintenance
     Article 2, Item 6 of the MRFTA defines resale price maintenance
as an act by which an entrepreneur who produces or sells a commodity,
fixes in advance the price or other restrictive terms and conditions
for each stage in the chain of distribution and requires resellers
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permissible except for those goods designated by the FTC which meet
the following requirements:
    (i) customers can easily recognize the quality of the products
as being equal;
   (ii) the products are used frequently in the daily life of
customers; and
  (iii) the market for the products is competitive.
     The MRFTA also permits resale price maintenance for copyrighted
works.
5.   General Unfair Trade Practices
     Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the MRFTA broadly enumerates certain
unfair trade practices and prohibits an entrepreneur from engaging
in such activities which will impair fair competition.  The
illustrative list includes the following activities:
    (i) Unreasonable refusal to trade with an entrepreneur or
unreasonable discrimination against an entrepreneur;
   (ii) Unreasonable transaction to eliminate a competitor;
  (iii) Unreasonable inducement or coercion of the customers of a
competitor;
   (iv) Dealing with the opposite party in a manner taking
unreasonable advantage of one's bargaining power;
    (v) Dealing with the opposite party on terms and conditions
which unreasonably restrict or interfere with the business
activities of the opposite party; or
   (vi) An advertisement (including use of tradename) or
representation which is false, deceptive or misleading to
customers with respect to an entrepreneur, commodity or
service.
     The FTC has promulgated more detailed lists of unfair trade
practices in its Public Notices.  These other regulated matters
include refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, inequitable treatment,
territorial or customer restrictions, tied selling, false,
exaggerated or slanderous advertising.
6.   Regulations Concerning International Agreements
     Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the MRFTA prohibits an entrepreneur
or an association of entrepreneurs from entering into international
agreements which contain matters that are in violation of the MRFTA.
Further, Article 33 of the MRFTA requires the following international
agreements to be reported to the FTC before they take effect in
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agreements and import distributorship agreements.  Public Notice No.
93-6 entitled "Scope and Criteria of Unfair Trade Practices in
International Agreements" enumerates the prohibited unfair trade
practices in international agreements.  Each of the following events
constitutes an unfair trade practice in technology inducement
agreements and copyright license agreements:
(i) The raw materials, components, equipment, related products,
etc. necessary for the manufacture of products (hereinafter the
"Licensed Products") using the technology provided by the
licensor (hereinafter the "Licensed Technology") are
unreasonably required to be purchased from the licensor or a
person designated by the licensor.
(ii) Sale/export of the Licensed Products is unreasonably
restricted.  Nevertheless such restrictions shall not be deemed
unreasonable in regard to any territory wherein the licensor:
(a) has already registered the Licensed Technology,
     (b) is engaging in ordinary sales activities with respect to
the Licensed Products, or
     (c) has given a third party an exclusive right of
distribution.
(iii)The licensee's trade parties, sales quantity, sales methods,
etc. are unreasonably restricted or sales prices and/or resale
prices are unreasonably fixed.
(iv) Dealing with products or use of technology, either of which is
in competition with or similar to the Licensed Products or the
Licensed Technology, as the case may be, is unreasonably
restricted for a considerable period of time after expiration
or for the duration of the agreement.
(v) After "intellectual property rights" such as industrial
property rights, or technical information (know-how) expire or
are no longer subject to confidentiality, continuing use of
Licensed Technology is unreasonably restricted, or royalties
are unreasonably assessed with respect to use thereof.
(vi) Royalties are assessed, or certain technologies are
unreasonably forced to be induced, with respect to products
other than the Licensed Products manufactured or sold by the
licensee using the Licensed Technology during the term of the
agreement.
(vii)Improvements of the technology by the licensee are
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improvements made by licensee to licensor are imposed.
(viii)The licensee is obligated  to pay an unreasonably large sum
      of money for sales promotion activities such as advertising
      for the Licensed Products.
(ix) The terms of the agreement concerning the method of calculating
the royalty and changes thereto, termination of the agreement,
arbitration of disputes and governing law are unreasonably
prejudicial to either party. 
(x) Raising objections to the effectiveness of alleged industrial
property rights or the confidentiality of know-how is
unreasonably prohibited, or licensor's liability for damages,
losses and costs arising out of or relating to the use of
Licensed Technology is unreasonably indemnified.
     Also, each of the following events shall constitute an unfair
trade practice in import distributorship agreements:
(i) Dealing with products which are in competition with and/or
similar to the concerned products (hereinafter the "Agreement
Products") is unreasonably restricted for a considerable period
of time after expiration or for the duration of the agreement.
(ii) The components, etc. of the Agreement Products are unreasonably
required to be purchased from the foreign business person who
is a party to the import distributorship agreement or from a
person designated by such foreign business person.
(iii)Any  of the  following restrictions are imposed with respect
     to the sale of the Agreement Products:
    (a) Sale/export territories for the Agreement Products are
unreasonably restricted. (Nevertheless, such restrictions
on export to any territory wherein a distributor, branch
or sales office of the foreign business person is already
established are not deemed unreasonable.)
    (b) The import distributor's sales territories or vendees in
Korea are unreasonably restricted.
    (c) The sales quantity is unreasonably restricted or a pre-
determined unreasonably large sales quota is required to
be attained.
(iv) With respect to resale of the Agreement Products, the sales
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chain of distribution are pre-determined. 
(v) The import distributor is obligated to pay an unreasonably
large pre-determined amount for sales promotion activities such
as advertisements.
(vi) The terms of the agreement concerning termination, arbitration
of disputes and governing law are unreasonably prejudicial to
one of the parties.
     Any provision of an agreement in violation of the above unfair
trade practices may be unenforceable and void.
Chapter IV. Structural Control
1. Merger Control
     The MRTFA regulates mergers categorized based upon the method
of combination as follows: acquisition of shares, inter-locking
directorates, amalgamations, transfer of a business or of a
substantial portion of its fixed assets, and establishment of a new
company.
      Mergers which substantially restrict competition in a
particular field of trade by involving a company whose paid-in
capital is five billion Won (approximately 6.25 million U.S. dollars)
or more, or whose total assets are twenty billion Won or more, are
prohibited.  The term "particular field of trade" means a market in
which competitive relationships exists.
     Mergers which may otherwise be prohibited may be permitted if
the Korean government deems it necessary to rationalize the industry
concerned or to strengthen its international competitiveness.
     As a means to monitor the legality of substantial proposed
mergers, companies must report the contemplated transaction to the
FTC in the following cases:
(i) Where an entrepreneur acquires or holds 20% or more of the
total issued shares of another entrepreneur.
    (ii) Where a holding company or other legal entity acquires or
holds 20% or more of the total issued shares of two
entrepreneurs respectively which are in competition with
each other or are in a dependent relationship in terms of
the procurement of raw materials.
   (iii) Where an officer or an employee of an entrepreneur is
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concurrently an officer of another entrepreneur in
competition or in a dependent relationship in terms of the
procurement of raw materials.
    (iv) Where an entrepreneur merges with another entrepreneur.
     (v) Where the whole or substantial part of a business of an
entrepreneur is assigned, leased or managed by another
entrepreneur.
    (vi) Where an entrepreneur subscribes for twenty percent or
more of the shares of a new company.
     Although the guideline for mergers was published in 1980 by the
FTC, it is not at all comprehensive.  In any event, the FTC has
issued Corrective Orders against proposed mergers only on two
occasions since 1980. 
2. Deterrence of Concentration of Economic Power
     The adverse effects of economic concentration, especially by so-
called "Chaebol" (conglomerates), have been a major social and
economic issue in Korea for the past two decades. 
     In order to regulate such economic concentration, the MRFTA
imposes the following restrictions: (i) Establishing a holding
company is prohibited in principle. (ii) An entrepreneur ("acquiring
entrepreneur") which belongs to one of the large conglomerates
designated by the FTC is prohibited from acquiring shares of an
affiliate entrepreneur which holds shares of the acquiring
entrepreneur. (iii) The total amount of capital investment by a
member company of a large conglomerate is limited to forty percent
of the net assets of the investing company. (iv) The total amount of
guarantee for borrowings of a member company of a large conglomerate
by another member company of the  conglomerate is limited to two
hundred percent of the amount of the guaranty-providing company. (v)
The voting rights of shares of a member company of a large
conglomerate group held by a financing or insurance company which
belongs to the same large conglomerate group are suspended.
Chapter V. Anti-trust Exemptions
     The MRFTA does not apply to the legitimate activities of an
entrepreneur or  trade association conducted in accordance with other
laws or decrees.  As well, the MRFTA does not apply to the activities
recognized as an exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, the
Patent Act, the Utility Model Act, the Design Act or the Trademark
Act.
     With respect to the financing and insurance industry, some
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MRFTA restrictions are not applicable such as merger control,
limitation of guarantee for affiliated entrepreneurs and resale 
price fixing.
Chapter VI. Conclusion
     Before the introduction of the MRFTA fourteen years ago, the
Korean government tended to encourage the formation of monopolies.
It was thought that the development and growth of Korean industry as
a competitive force in world markets could be most effectively
accomplished given the nation's limited resources by allowing a small
number of companies to benefit from the domination of markets
domestically.
     Therefore, since early 1960, all major industries have been
controlled by only a few "chaebol".  Recently, however, Korean
government policy is changing to promote free competition in every
field of business except for a few critical industries such as
electricity, telecommunications, transportation, energy and financing
industries.  Due to the short history of anti-trust laws in Korea,
many of the legal issues in this area have not yet been tested by the
Korean courts.  However, the FTC has been increasingly active in
enforcing competition laws and the extent of this development in
Korea still remains to be seen.
 
